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 Mobilizing American Youth for Total War: 
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 
 HATTORI Masako ＊ 
 　 When the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was introduced to 
Congress in June of that year, its supporters contended that it was a “democratic” 
measure to keep the nation from falling under an “enforced discipline imposed by 
autarchical [ sic ] tyrants.” 1  Indeed, “selective service,” a term invented during 
World War I, had come to embody a democratic way of conscripting civilians, 
implying that all draft-age men were equally subject to military service, regardless 
of economic means or social status.  During World War I, selection of draftees had 
been made by lottery, a measure that appeared to be fair to all.  Conscription for 
World War II built on the administrative policies carried out during World War I 
and symbolized the American belief that the United States, unlike the dictatorships 
the nation confronted, was fighting the total war democratically. 
　 The idea that civilian mobilization for World War II in the United States was 
unique and exceptional has subsisted until today in both scholarly and public 
discourses.  At the core of this narrative is an assumption that civilian mobilization 
for World War II in the U.S., especially the mobilization of military manpower, 
was limited to the period from December 1941 to August 1945, when the country 
was officially at war.  Moreover, this four-year period is separated from the years 
of the Great Depression, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor serving as  the 
decisive turning point that dragged the nation into the war. 2  The division between 
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 1.  Luther A. Huston, “Nation Awaits Plan for Its Youth,”  New York Times (hereafter  NYT ), 
June 23, 1940. 
 2. For example, journalist Richard Lingeman has maintained that “For millions of Home 
Front Americans those four war years seemed endless, an unreal time, a limbo between prewar 
and postwar reality, a jive-tempo, abnormal period of change, stress, loneliness, dislocation, 
which you lived through all the while dreaming of a postwar world of peace and plenty.” 
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the years before and after the attack was not necessarily clear to contemporaries, 
however.  Many New Deal programs became the institutional basis of war 
mobilization policies and the Depression was overcome only with the economic 
boom created by World War II.  Moreover, the Selective Training and Service Act 
of 1940 was signed into law on September 16, 1940, more than a year before the 
U.S. entered the war, requiring men of ages twenty-one to thirty-six to register 
with local draft boards and the selected men to go through a year of military 
training. 3  In historian Michael Sherry’s words, the U.S. in the several years before 
Pearl Harbor was “slipping into a twilight world of neither-war-nor-peace, at once 
a noncombat belligerent and nonbelligerent in combat.” 4  Examining U.S. 
mobilization for World War II within the four-year time frame, therefore, misses 
the significance of these turbulent and transitional years in which the Depression 
was not yet overcome but the U.S. experience of World War II was drawing near. 
Building on works by historians Mary L. Dudziak and Laura McEnaney that 
question the conventional four-year time frame, this article approaches U.S. 
mobilization for World War II as a  process that had origins in the years before 
Pearl Harbor instead of seeing it as an impromptu reaction to the attack. 5 
Describing World War II as a “limbo” stands in striking contrast with how the war has 
occupied the very center of the twentieth-century history in many other countries. Lingeman, 
 Donʼt You Know There’s a War On? The American Home Front, 1941 ― 1945 ([Orig. 1970] New 
York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2003), 6. In U.S. history scholarship, studies of 
the Depression and the New Deal have focused primarily on the 1930s, while those of World 
War II explore the period from 1941 to 1945. For studies of the New Deal that examine the 
war’s impact on New Deal liberalism, see Alan Brinkley,  The End of Reform: New Deal 
Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Knopf, 1995); Ira Katznelson,  Fear Itself: The 
New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013). James T. Sparrow 
emphasizes the significance of World War II (compared to that of the New Deal) for the 
development of the U.S. federal state. Sparrow,  Warfare State: World War II Americans and 
the Age of Big Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For the historiography 
of the American home front in general, see Allan M. Winkler, “World War II Homefront: A 
Historiography,”  OAH Magazine of History 16, no. 3 (2002): 5 ― 6, 8; Richard Polenberg, “The 
Good War? A Reappraisal of How World War II Affected American Society,”  Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 100, no. 3 (1992): 295 ― 322. World War II has not been a 
major topic of inquiry for historians of education and youth in the U.S. Educational histories 
that do examine World War II have focused largely on institutional changes that the war 
produced. For a historiographical review of American education in World War II, see Charles 
Dorn,  American Education, Democracy, and the Second World War (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 13 ― 18.
 3. Michael Sherry,  In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1995), chap. 1; George Q. Flynn,  The Draft, 1940 ― 1973 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1993), 18.
 4. Sherry,  In the Shadow of War , 44.
 5. Dudziak shows that the four-year time frame bookended with Pearl Harbor and 
Hiroshima is a cultural construction by examining how the war’s legal consequences spanned 
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Specifically, I show how issues concerning the conscription of “youth” and its 
political and social consequences occupied the center of the debates over the 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 in Congress and the broader public. 
The age group that had come to be considered “youth,” generally encompassing 
men and women in their late teens to mid-twenties, did not coincide with the draft 
age set by the act.  Yet, many Americans, some consciously and others 
unconsciously, labeled the bill as a plan to mobilize youth.  As the following pages 
reveal, the focus on youth was due not only to immediate national defense 
concerns created by the aggression of the Axis powers but also to social and 
cultural discourses on youth that preceded the national emergency.  Supporters 
and opponents of the bill alike, from across the political spectrum, blended 
immediate concerns with long-term issues as they discussed the act, questioning 
whether the draft would “toughen” or “militarize” modern youth, whether it would 
help solve the massive youth unemployment caused by the Depression, or whether 
it would be a step toward a totalitarian state or a social welfare state.  By showing 
how the debate over the act reflected a nation being shadowed not only by the 
Depression or World War II but by both, this article invites historians to rethink 
the chronology of the twentieth-century U.S. history.
 　 American youth exemplifies how long-standing social problems and war 
emergency concerns intertwined in 1940.  On the one hand, the American public 
had been attending to the “youth problem” ―a set of cultural anxieties that had 
emerged largely due to the unprecedented youth unemployment caused by the 
Depression, the debate over the extent to which the federal government should 
intervene, and the political and military mobilization of youth elsewhere in the 
world that seemed to signify youth’s vulnerability to ideologies incongruent with 
American democracy. 6  On the other hand were immediate military-strategic 
questions that the Axis powers had created, such as whether military mobilization 
of civilians indicated a step toward intervention in the European war or a national 
defense measure, whether the draft was more democratic and efficient than the 
volunteer system on which the U.S. had traditionally relied, and who should be 
called first.  Historical scholarship has not examined how these two realms of 
public interest overlapped.  On the one hand, the youth problem has been 
beyond these years. McEnaney demonstrates how the impact of the war on American society 
did not disappear in August 1945 by exploring a social history of the demobilization period 
that lasted for years after the war. Mary L. Dudziak,  War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its 
Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), see especially chap. 2; Laura 
McEnaney, “Nightmares on Elm Street: Demobilizing in Chicago, 1945 ― 1953,”  Journal of 
American History 94, no. 4 (2006): 1265 ― 91.
 6. Stephen Lassonde, “The Real, Real Youth Problem,”  Reviews in American History , 22, 
no. 1 (1994): 149 ― 51; Homer P. Rainey, “What Is the American Youth Problem?”  Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 194 (November 1937): 18.
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considered primarily as a domestic problem of the Depression. 7  On the other 
hand, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 is usually mentioned in 
foreign policy contexts, either signifying a major defeat of the isolationist 
movement or serving as a small anecdote in the prologue to a history of World 
War II. 8  Examining the nationwide debate over the Selective Training and Service 
Act of 1940 through the lens of youth illuminates the great extent to which 
American concerns over the Depression and war in fact intersected. 
 　 Rethinking the time frame of the U.S. history of World War II through the issue 
of youth conscription not only helps historians to rethink the chronology of U.S. 
history but bring U.S. history of World War II into dialogue with studies of 
civilian mobilization for the war in other nations. 9  This article by no means 
intends to propose dismissing the impact that the Pearl Harbor attack had on 
American society.  Nor does it fail to recognize that the U.S. never succumbed to 
dictatorship.  Moreover, the experience of World War II for most American 
civilians was different from what civilians in other nations endured, primarily in 
that Americans on the mainland never suffered from serious military attacks. 10 
Yet, assuming that such aspects of the U.S. history of World War II attest to its 
exceptional nature forecloses possibilities of deeper and comparative analyses.  As 
this article suggests, mobilizing civilians “democratically” indicated not an army 
drawn equally from all segments of the society, but a disproportional draft of 
youth, because many youths were single and with little practical work experience 
 7. Edward A. Krug,  The Shaping of the American High School, 1920 ― 1941 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1972); Richard A. Reiman,  The New Deal and American Youth: 
Ideas and Ideals in a Depression Decade (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992); 
Kriste Lindenmeyer, “New Opportunities for Children in the Great Depression in the United 
States,” in  The Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World , ed. Paula S. Fass (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 441.
 8. Sherry,  In the Shadow of War , 47 ― 51; Katznelson,  Fear Itself , 310 ― 13; Wayne S. Cole, 
 Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932 ― 1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1983), 375 ― 79; 
Flynn,  The Draft , chap. 2; J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr.,  The First Peacetime 
Draft (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
 9. For attempts to understand World War II from a comparative perspective, see Yasushi 
Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita, eds,  Total War and ‘Modernization’ 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds.,  The 
Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919 ― 1939 (Washington DC: 
German Historical Institute, 2003). For comparative analyses of the New Deal, see Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch,  Three New Deals: Reflections on Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s Italy, and 
Hitler’s Germany, 1933 ― 1939 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Kieran Patel,  Soldiers 
of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933 ― 1945 , trans. Thomas 
Dunlap (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). These attempts have been led 
primarily by historians outside U.S. history.
 10. Mary L. Dudziak, “Death and the War Power,” Emory Legal Studies Research Paper 
(July 24, 2017), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004292, 20. 
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useful for the war industries on the home front (a situation that was severely 
amplified by the Depression).  Historians have associated the mobilization of 
youth for World War II primarily with the Axis powers, but men who fought on 
 both sides of the war were younger than soldiers of World War I. 11  By rethinking 
the U.S. history of World War II through the lens of youth, this article encourages 
historians to look beyond the dichotomy of liberal democracy and totalitarian 
dictatorship for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the 
implications of total war for American society. 
 I:  Interwar Plans for Universal Conscription 
　  The United States adopted a mass draft for the first time in World War I, during 
which draftees consisted of 72 percent of the U.S. armed forces.  Until then, in a 
country where conscription was considered antithetical to its founding principles 
of decentralized governance and individual liberty, civilians had been expected to 
take arms voluntarily in times of emergency.  During the Civil War, for example, 
fewer than 8 percent of the Union army men had been draftees.  Upon introducing 
the Selective Service Act of 1917 to the American public, President Woodrow 
Wilson emphasized that it was “in no sense a conscription of the unwilling,” but 
rather “selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass.” 12  The act, signed 
into law a month after the U.S. entered the war, required all men between ages 
twenty-one and thirty-one to register with the selective service office, and those 
chosen by lottery were called. 13 
 　 The draft was terminated soon after the armistice in November 1918, and the 
size of the regular army was quickly reduced.  However, conscription plans 
continued to be developed.  While the disillusionment with World War I gave rise 
to a powerful antiwar movement in American society, other Americans were 
convinced of the need to prepare for another war of similar or greater scale so as 
not to repeat the makeshift mobilization the country had experienced during World 
War I. 14  For example, the American Legion, a child of World War I, began to 
study conscription as early as 1921.  A bill the Legion proposed in 1928 was 
 11. Mapheus Smith, “Populational Characteristics of American Servicemen in World War 
II,”  Scientific Monthly 65, no. 3 (1947): 247; Paul Fussell,  Wartime: Understanding and 
Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 52.
 12. Christopher Capozzola,  Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the 
Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8, 18; John Whiteclay 
Chambers II,  To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: Free Press, 
1987), 1, 73.
 13. In September 1918, the draft age was expanded to ages eighteen to forty-five, but the 
war ended before inducting teens. Chambers,  To Raise an Army , 198.
 14. Ibid., 242; Lawrence S. Wittner,  Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 
1933 ― 1983 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), chap. 1.
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comprehensive in scope, stipulating the conscription of personnel and the 
conscription of capital and industrial resources.  The bill never won congressional 
support because of its ambitious mobilization plan, but that did not necessarily 
mean that members of the Congressional Committees on Military Affairs were 
against the idea of the draft itself.  In fact, many congressmen considered that 
drafting men was much less controversial than the conscription of material 
resources.  Some believed that “There is no trouble about getting the men under 
the draft act,” while others considered that “it is a good thing to have a 
conscription act.” The issue was less a matter of whether to adopt a universal draft 
than when to do so. 15 
 　 The military also began to formulate its plans for a universal draft soon after 
the end of World War I.  The National Defense Act of 1920 stipulated that the 
duties of the War Department General Staff included preparing plans for the 
mobilization of personnel and material resources.  Based on this act, the Joint 
Army and Navy Selective Service Committee (JANSSC) was established in 1926 
to study conscription and train reserve officers, many of whom would be called to 
duty in 1940 to set up the new selective service system. 16  A pamphlet the 
JANSSC published in 1939 emphasized that the draft was an American tradition. 
The drafting of soldiers in the United States, the pamphlet stated, “did not begin 
in 1917.” Rather, “it is as old as white America.” According to this pamphlet, the 
tradition can be traced back to the Continental Congress, which, in 1775, 
recommended that “all able-bodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of 
age, be formed into companies of militia.” 17  Military leaders in the interwar years, 
then, had been conceiving of conscription as a measure to secure military 
manpower.  However, they did not expect that a universal draft could be realized 
in peacetime.  Given the controversial nature of military conscription and the 
public hostility to military rebuilding that was prevalent throughout the interwar 
years, military leaders assumed that Washington and the public alike would accept 
the draft only when the U.S. was officially at war. 18 
 15. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs,  Universal Draft: Hearings 
before the Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 455, H.R. 8313, H.R. 8329 , 70th Cong., 1st 
sess. (Washington DC: GPO, 1928), 1 ― 3, 14, 16.
 16. Lewis B. Hershey,  Selective Service in Peacetime: First Report of the Director of 
Selective Service, 1940 ― 41 (Washington DC: GPO, 1942), 9, 11.
 17. JANSSC,  American Selective Service: A Brief Account of Its Historical Background 
and Its Probable Future Form (Washington DC: GPO, 1939), 5.
 18. Mark Skinner Watson,  Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington DC: 
Historical Division, Dept. of the Army, 1950), 172, 183. The public hostility from which the 
army was suffering and the significant decline in military budget may also have made a 
military draft appear less feasible. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during World War 
II, recalled that in the interwar years the army was “gradually being starved into a condition 
almost comparable to its pre-Spanish-American War condition.” Ibid., 3 ― 5, 26, chap. 2.
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 II:  The Youth Problem 
 　 Youth as a concept signifying a transitional life stage between childhood and 
adulthood had entered the American public discourse by the early twentieth 
century.  The industrialization of American society and its social consequences―
the enactment of child labor laws and the extension of schooling, for example―
had pushed back the age in which children normally entered the labor market. 
The dramatic rise of secondary-school and college attendance in the interwar 
years also spread this image of youth as a distinct age group whose life centered 
on a unique peer culture that differed from those of children and adults. 19 
 　 The Great Depression further turned adults’ attention to youth.  The 
unemployment rate of youth between ages eighteen and twenty-five went higher 
than that of any other age group.  Images of young people without jobs strolling 
the streets or becoming transients frequently appeared in the mass media, making 
youth a visible social problem that needed to be addressed. 20  The federal 
government established work relief programs specifically for youth, notably the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) for young men and the National Youth 
Administration (NYA) for youth of both sexes.  The American Council on 
Education, an umbrella organization representing educational associations, 
schools, and colleges, as well as state and municipal departments of education, 
established the American Youth Commission (AYCM) in 1935 to study and 
popularize the problems and needs of youth. 21  In short, the “discovery” of youth 
was “one of the by-products of the depression,” observed the program director of 
the Young Men’s Christian Association of New York City in his contribution to 
the November 1937 issue of the  Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science devoted to “The Prospect for Youth.” 22  No single definition of 
“youth” existed, but the word came to encompass not only teenagers but also 
 19. Aubrey Williams, “The Government’s Responsibility for Youth,”  Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 194 (November 1937), 120; Lindenmeyer, 
“New Opportunities for Children,” 442; Paula S. Fass,  The Damned and the Beautiful: 
American Youth in the 1920s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 5 ― 9.
 20. Lassonde, “Real, Real Youth Problem,” 149; Kenneth Holland and Frank Ernest Hill, 
 Youth in the CCC (Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1942), 8; Lindenmeyer, 
“New Opportunities for Children,” 441.
 21. AYCM,  Youth, Defense, and the National Welfare: Recommendations of the American 
Youth Commission of the American Council on Education (Washington DC: AYCM, [1940]), 
10, 12. For an overview of the political activism of educators during the Depression, see David 
Tyack, Robert Lowe, and Elisabeth Hansot,  Public Schools in Hard Times: The Great 
Depression and Recent Years (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).
 22. J. H. Bentley, “The Vocational Guidance of Youth,”  Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 194 (November 1937): 34.
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young men and women in their twenties because of the high unemployment rate 
of youth in these age groups. 23 
 　  The youth problem of the 1930s was magnified not only by mass 
unemployment but also by a growing awareness that youth in other countries were 
being mobilized politically.  Newspapers published sensational photos of young 
Germans, Russians, and Japanese marching in uniform, reflecting the growing 
public debate over the implications of the rise of “totalitarianism” elsewhere in the 
world for American democracy. 24  Adults compared foreign youths with American 
youth.  For example, “Fascism and democracy were not on the minds of most 
jobless youths, but fascism and young people were on the minds of NYA leaders,” 
observes a historian of the NYA. 25  On the other hand, the rise of college youth’s 
political activism triggered by the Depression worried adults on the right that 
American youth were bending to Communist thought. 26 
 　 Adults across the political spectrum, therefore, saw different implications of 
these foreign youths for American youth.  Some conservatives reconfirmed their 
conviction that modern American youth had gotten “soft.” Statistical data acquired 
from the selective service during World War I had informed them that 46.8 percent 
of the 2,750,000 men with complete medical records had been considered 
physically “defective.” A movement for the establishment of a universal military 
training program of American youth, which originated in the early twentieth 
century, persisted throughout these years as a way to toughen American youth in 
body and mind.  The Military Training Camps Association (MTCA), the chief 
promoter of the 1940 draft act, was one of its main advocates. 27 
 23. Ibid.; Eunice Barnard, “Classroom and Campus: Plight of Youth Main Problem of 
Educators During Past Year,”  NYT , December 29, 1935. Slight changes to the eligibility for the 
CCC and the NYA were made during the lives of the two agencies, but the CCC mainly 
enlisted men of ages eighteen to twenty-five and the NYA enrolled youth of ages sixteen to 
twenty-four. Holland and Hill,  Youth in the CCC , 14, 46; NYA,  Final Report of the National 
Youth Administration, Fiscal Years 1936 ― 1943 (Washington DC: GPO, 1944), 49, 85.
 24. “Boys of Europe Trained for War,”  NYT , September 30, 1934; “Farewell to Youth,” 
editorial,  NYT , September 20, 1936; “Europe’s Youth Calmly Surveys a ‘Next War,’”  NYT , 
October 3, 1937; “Schooling for Young Totalitarians,”  NYT , October 2, 1938.
 25. Reiman,  New Deal and American Youth , 124, quoted in Lassonde, “Real, Real Youth 
Problem,” 152.
 26. Historians have not agreed on the scale of the political activism of college youth in this 
period. Some maintain that college youth remained largely conservative even at the depth of 
the Depression while others disagree. Christopher P. Loss,  Between Citizens and the State: The 
Politics of American Higher Education in the 20th  Century (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), 71; David O. Levine,  The American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915 ―
 1940 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 205 ― 207; Robert Cohen,  When the Old Left 
Was Young: Student Radicals and America’s First Mass Student Movement, 1929 ― 1941 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), xviii.
 27. [Conference on Training for Citizenship and National Defense,]  Special Report of the 
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 　 To liberal and leftist educators seeking greater social welfare for youth, 
highlighting the danger of youth’s vulnerability to the future of American 
democracy was a way to secure public support for their cause.  For example, the 
February 1938 issue of the  Journal of Educational Sociology , entitled “The 
Challenge of the Youth,” declared that “The future of a democracy lies with its 
youth.” 28  In his contribution to the issue, a professor of education argued that 
youth around the world were disillusioned by the path the world had taken since 
World War I.  Political situations in many countries were unstable, and many 
youths had lost their jobs due to the Depression.  As a result, he continued, youth 
in many countries had become “the tool of scheming imperialists” who 
successfully won the minds of frustrated young people by giving them jobs and a 
sense of security.  The conditions surrounding American youth were equally dire, 
he insisted. 29 
 　 Finally, the mid - 1930s marked the height of the isolationist sentiment in 
American society, culminating in the series of Neutrality Acts that strictly limited 
U.S. involvement in military affairs abroad. 30  To the isolationists, European youth 
represented the world into which the U.S. should not be dragged.  For example, a 
cartoon by C. D. Batchelor that won the Pulitzer Prize for Editorial Cartooning in 
1937 depicted a bewildered young man representing “Any European Youth” being 
lured by a whore representing “War.” The caption read: “Come on in, I’ll treat you 
right.  I used to know your Daddy.” 31 
 　 In short, the youth problem signified the blending of issues of economy, 
education, social welfare, and foreign policy into a broader debate over the future 
of democratic governance in a world that appeared increasingly undemocratic. 
This was carried into the debate over military preparedness, as exemplified by the 
Secretary of War to the President on the Conference on Training for Citizenship and National 
Defense, 1922 (Washington DC: GPO, 1923), 11 ― 12; Clifford and Spencer, Jr.,  First Peacetime 
Draft , 18 ― 20. The movement for a universal military training program was launched before 
World War I by a group of white, professional elite men driven by both a geopolitical concern 
over the position of the U.S. in a world of imperial rivalries and a fear of the “degeneration” of 
the American manhood amidst the social disorder generated by the putative end of the frontier 
in 1890, industrialization, and mass immigration from southern and eastern Europe to 
explosively growing urban centers. Anders Stephanson,  Manifest Destiny: American Expansion 
and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), chap. 3; Chambers,  To Raise an 
Army , 74 ― 81, 89 ― 101; Stephen Skowronek,  Building a New American State: The Expansion of 
National Administrative Capacities, 1877 ― 1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), chap. 7.
 28. Harvey W. Zorbaugh, “Editorial,”  Journal of Educational Sociology (hereafter  JES ) 11, 
no. 6 (1938): 321.
 29. Francis J. Brown, “How Fare American Youth?”  JES 11, no. 6 (1938): 335 ― 41.
 30. Cole,  Roosevelt and Isolationists , chap. 12.
 31. Sherry,  In the Shadow of War , illustration following p. 84.
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debate over the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 
 III:  The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 
 　 In May 1940, a group of a hundred men gathered at the Harvard Club in New 
York City to discuss a plan to alert Americans to the need to better prepare for 
national defense and possibly a new war.  These men were members of the 
MTCA, the gathering of elite men that had provided voluntary military training 
programs to civilian men since 1915.  Its members and sympathizers included 
leading public figures of the east coast, including university presidents such as 
James Bryant Conant of Harvard and Harold W. Dodds of Princeton and political 
magnates including Henry L. Stimson, the former and soon-to-be Secretary of 
War.  Making use of its strong connections with Washington, the MTCA decided 
to draft a universal conscription bill of their own to celebrate the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of their military training program. 32  The association’s central figure, 
who was also FDR’s childhood friend, asked the president to endorse the idea.  By 
then, FDR had launched programs for rearmament and the mobilization of 
resources for national defense and aiding the allies, generating an economic boom 
in the industries that produced tanks and planes.  However, producing weapons 
and mobilizing civilians militarily had different political implications.  FDR was 
personally in favor of the draft, but he hesitated to declare so publicly to avoid the 
risk of being misunderstood by the public and his isolationist enemies that he was 
attempting to draw the U.S. into the war.  As a result, the MTCA proceeded on its 
own.  Their bill was introduced to Congress in June 1940 as the Burke-Wadsworth 
Act, better known as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 33 
 　 The tide of the times pushed the bill through Congress.  The bill was introduced 
to Congress on June 20; France surrendered to Germany soon thereafter.  British 
troops were also retreating from the continent.  Italy had declared war on June 10. 
Shocked by the aggression of the Axis powers, Americans, who had been equally 
divided on the issue of compulsory military training in a poll taken on June 2, 
changed their views.  A Gallup poll of June 23 found 64 percent of Americans in 
support of compulsory military training and 36 percent in opposition. 34  In July, 
 32. Flynn,  The Draft , 11; Grenville Clark to FDR, May 24, 1940, “Selective Service 
Legislation, Jan.-May 1940” folder, Official File 1413, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, NY; Watson,  Chief of Staff , 189; Clifford and Spencer, Jr.,  First Peacetime Draft , 14.
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FDR appointed Stimson, who was in favor of the draft, to replace isolationist 
Harry H. Woodring as Secretary of War. 35  As a consequence, the War Department, 
which had been skeptical of the passage of a peacetime draft act, approached the 
MTCA to work out a revision that met their expectations. 36  On August 2, in the 
midst of the congressional debate over the bill, FDR publicly expressed his 
support for the bill. 37 
 　 The MTCA had originally envisioned a highly comprehensive selective service 
system that provided for the registration of all males between ages eighteen and 
sixty-five, with those between ages twenty-one and forty-five subject to military 
training and service and the rest to home defense programs. 38  This extensive age 
range, the MTCA expected, would affect virtually every household and create a 
“united front for a great national defense effort.” By contrast, the War Department 
was interested in obtaining the best possible fighting force, military wise.  Firmly 
believing that young men were better soldiers, it proposed that the age range be 
twenty-one to thirty-one, and would expand to ages eighteen to thirty-five only 
when Congress declared a national emergency. 39  After the Senate made the age 
range twenty-one to thirty-one, and the House twenty-one to forty-five, the final 
bill settled on ages twenty-one to thirty-six. 40  It stipulated the registration of all 
males in this age range, including both citizens and male resident aliens who 
declared their intentions of becoming U.S. citizens. 41  Those inducted were 
required to serve for twelve months, after which they were to be placed in the 
reserves for ten years or until they reached age forty-five, whichever came first. 
Draftees were guaranteed accommodation, medical care, salary, and 
compensation.  As a “peacetime” law, no more than nine hundred thousand men 
were to be in active training or service at one time.  Moreover, isolationists 
succeeded in stamping on the bill that the purpose of the draft was defensive, and 
therefore, draftees were not to be deployed “beyond the limits of the Western 
Hemisphere except in the territories and possessions of the United States, 
including the Philippines.” 42  It was not a permanent measure but an emergency 
Conscription: Congress and Selective Service, 1940 ― 1945” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 
1971), 24.
 35. Cole,  Roosevelt and Isolationists , 367 ― 68.
 36. Watson,  Chief of Staff , 191 ― 92; Flynn,  The Draft , 12 ― 13.
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 40. Hershey,  Selective Service in Peacetime , 33.
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one, with an expiration date in May 1945. 43 
 　 To maintain fairness and equality in the selection process, the law stipulated no 
group deferment; only certain individuals, such as public officials and persons 
engaged in activities assumed critical to national defense or public interest, 
ministers, men with dependents, and conscientious objectors would be deferred. 
Students were allowed to complete the academic year if called in 1940 but were 
not to defer as such later than July 1941. 44  This deferment system, however, 
eventually resulted in drafting significantly more men under twenty-five years old 
than older men, because many of these younger men were single, had no 
dependents, and were unemployed or engaged in an occupation that was not 
considered for deferment. 45  Though the age limit set by the bill did not coincide 
with the age range of “youth” used in other contexts, those involved in the debate 
over the bill assumed that the bill concerned American “youth” more than 
Americans of other age groups. 
　 The Congressional debate over the bill was intense, so much so that the  New 
York Times reported that “Senators leveled personal charges against each other in 
a manner not witnessed since the days of the late Senator Huey Long.” 46 
Supporters of the bill argued that the United States, as well as American 
democracy, was seriously at risk of being attacked by Germany; that the volunteer 
system alone would not meet the scale and rapidity required for the mobilization 
of military manpower; and that selective service was truly democratic. 47  Senator 
Morris Sheppard, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, explained 
that in the proposed conscription system the “burdens of military service will be 
borne not only by the willing and those compelled to volunteer by lack of funds,” 
but instead “will be borne equally by all classes, regardless of economic means.” 
Because the “aggressions of certain dictator-controlled nations become every day 
more menacing toward free and independent democratic countries,” failure to act 
 43. Clifford and Spencer Jr.,  First Peacetime Draft , 232 ― 33.
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promptly would result in “perilous consequences,” he insisted. 48  Secretary of War 
Stimson elaborated on these points before the House Committee on Military 
Affairs.  According to him, the nation’s past war experiences had proved the 
volunteer system a “costly failure.” Great Britain also experienced enormous 
losses and confusion in World War I and the ongoing war because the country 
favored volunteering and delayed the adoption of conscription, he continued.  To 
Stimson, the fault of a voluntary system was that a man who might be more useful 
if he stayed home might rush to enlist.  On the other hand, a selective service 
system compelled each man to serve in the capacity where he was most effective, 
even against his will.  Selective draft, according to Stimson, therefore distributed 
the duty of national defense upon every citizen without disrupting normal civilian 
life.  In short, it was “the only efficient system in the great task of a modern war,” 
and “the only system which is appropriate to a democracy.” 49  This way of 
mobilizing civilians assumed that a man who was single, had no dependents, and 
whose work was not considered vital for the nation would be called first. 50  George 
C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, added that compulsory military training “would 
have a very beneficial effect” on the young men of the country.  By adopting it, 
the U.S. “would have a more homogeneous people, a more public-spirited, a more 
public-minded citizenry” that appreciated the obligations of citizenship. 51 
 　 Outside the halls of Congress, the expectations for the bill went beyond what 
the bill legally promised to do.  The argument that the military training program 
the bill proposed would “toughen” and discipline youth was popular among the 
bill’s supporters, as Marshall’s comments mentioned above indicate.  A writer 
with a pen name of “Hardboiled Realist” wrote to the  New York Herald Tribune 
arguing that modern technology had turned American youth “soft.” According to 
this author, modern youth “has never been obliged to carry in the wood and coal 
or carry out the ashes.  It will not walk a half mile if it can get a ride.” “Once 
trained,” the author continued, “the average youngster will return to civil life a 
more useful citizen, healthier in both body and mind.” 52  A minister suggested that 
all young men graduating from high school or reaching his eighteenth birthday be 
required to serve in the military for two years, on the grounds that “In my 
experience in the ministry I have found very few young men graduating from high 
school matured enough to enter directly into college, or to go into the business 
 48. Senator Morris Sheppard (TX), speaking on S. 4164, August 9, 1940, 76th Cong., 3rd 
sess.,  Congressional Record 86, pt. 9: 10092 ― 93.
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world.” Military service, according to him, would “make a man out of him.” 53 
 　 Others saw in the draft an opportunity to advance their social welfare goals. 
Considering war mobilization as an opportunity for social reform was no more 
new than the idea that military training would “toughen” youth.  Many Progressive 
reformers had supported the U.S. entry into World War I, expecting that the war 
would be a prime opportunity for social reform.  Some of them regretted their 
decision after having witnessed the horrors of modern war, but the idea of seeing 
national emergency―both the Great Depression and World War II―as a 
breakthrough for reform persisted. 54 
 　 In August 1940, for example, the AYCM published a pamphlet titled  Youth, 
Defense, and the National Welfare .  Acknowledging the necessity of speedily and 
efficiently expanding the size of the military, the pamphlet expressed the AYCM’s 
support of the bill. 55  It claimed that the obligation to serve in the common defense 
in time of need was a “universal” and “elementary duty of citizenship, older than 
civilization, and not absent from any form of organized government, democratic 
or otherwise.” That said, the pamphlet continued, compulsory military service was 
a “very serious undertaking” in which men would be “trained to kill and to take 
the risk of being killed in order that the democratic community of free people may 
continue to exist.” As youth would bear most of the burden, the authors insisted 
that no selective service bill should be passed without acceptance by the 
government of full responsibility for the provision of “adequate economic, 
educational, health, and recreational conditions” for all youth.  They stressed that 
the measures that the government had taken―the NYA, the CCC, and other 
federal aid to in-school programs―were not sufficient to serve the entire youth 
population. 56 
 　 The pamphlet recommended that no one be called before reaching the age of 
twenty-one, and that draftees should be chosen by lot and called equally from a 
wide range of ages to avoid the burdens of military service to be concentrated on 
one age group, especially among “the unemployed boys of 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 
who are most willing to volunteer.” Furthermore, the number of draftees should be 
“limited strictly to those needed for military reasons,” even though “military 
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training may have certain values as preparation for citizenship” 57 Taken as a 
whole, the authors asserted that the number of youth called for service must be 
minimal, but because  some young men would be asked to risk their lives for the 
nation,  all young men and women deserved better welfare. 
 　 Opponents of the bill launched a vigorous campaign to prevent the bill from 
passing through Congress.  Their central concern was whether youth conscription 
was democratic.  A senator criticized the MTCA for attempting to “regiment 
American boys.” 58  The isolationist Senator Robert Taft insisted that “No measure 
considered since I have been in the Senate has sought to change so much the basic 
theory of American life.” 59 “The theory behind it leads directly to totalitarianism,” 
he continued, and it was “absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty 
which have always been considered a part of American democracy.” 60  Instead, he 
argued, the existing volunteer system should be used first.  According to him, the 
volunteer system had become ineffective because of a popular assumption that the 
military was an unpleasant occupation that “every boy instinctively avoids.” If it 
became attractive, many men, including millions of unemployed men and youth in 
the CCC camps, would volunteer, and “we will have a more earnest, interested, 
permanent, and enthusiastic force.” 61 
 　 Taft was not alone in connecting the bill to the unemployment problem the 
Depression had created. “Count up our thousands of C. C. C. boys, thousands of 
unemployed on relief, cut down the many too many [ sic ] W. P. A. men that are 
now put on every W. P. A. job.  Add all these up, and you will find the government 
has here a large army of men to put into camps and train at once,” a woman wrote 
to the  New York Herald Tribune . “Why should men who have jobs, and working 
to support themselves, be forced to give up their jobs when the country has 
thousands of men who are already a care and expense to the people?” she 
insisted. 62  A graduate student called the bill unnecessary and wasteful.  Referring 
to FDR’s second inaugural address of 1937 in which the president asked 
Americans to face with his government the reality that “one third of a nation [was] 
ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished,” she proposed “putting some of this money 
to constructive use in helping that forgotten ‘one-third of a nation.’” 63 
 　 Youths opposed to the bill also attacked the rhetoric of the bill’s advocates that 
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a selective service system was democratic. 64  A young man of draft age pointed 
out that under the bill, the “burden will fall entirely upon 1,500,000 young men.” 
He insisted that “It is hardly fair that women, older persons, men with dependents 
and workers with good jobs in defense industries should escape completely at the 
expense of the few.” 65  The Southern Negro Youth Congress addressed a letter to 
FDR stating that “Three million Negro Americans, voteless and without 
representation in congress because of the un-American Poll Tax laws and the 
flagrant abrogation of the 14th and 15th amendments to the constitution declare 
their determined opposition” to the bill that would “regiment our youth.” 66 
 　 A group of educators opposed to the bill published a document titled “A 
Declaration Against Conscription” in the  New York Times . 67  The declaration, 
signed by two hundred and forty educators, clergymen, and business leaders, was 
prepared by the Committee on Militarism in Education (CME), a New York-based 
group established in 1925 by prominent pacifists and their sympathizers to protest 
military training in civilian schools and colleges. 68  The statement declared that 
military conscription in peacetime “smacks of totalitarianism.” 69  The signers 
rejected as “transparent sophistry the contention that conscription under the name 
of ‘selective service’ is democratic and that voluntary military service is 
undemocratic.” Furthermore, they argued, conscription would result in widespread 
dislocation in business, industry, agriculture, and higher education.  A volunteer 
system with a pay sufficiently attractive to induce the required numbers of 
enrollees would be “vastly preferable” to conscription, they insisted. 70  The signers 
included prominent names such as historian Howard K. Beale, John Dewey, 
sociologist Robert S. Lynd, Rev. A. J. Muste, Socialist Norman Thomas, and 
journalist Oswald Garrison Villard. 71 
 　 Although the statement attracted substantial support, it also faced much 
opposition and alienated many who had supported CME’s previous campaigns 
against military training in schools. “It is one thing to oppose militarism in 
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education in times of comparative peace and safety.  It is another thing to oppose 
the only possible means of protecting the independence of this country at a time 
when it is in imminent danger,” one opponent of the statement argued. 72  A social 
scientist stated that he would approve a bill to draft youth because the “lack of any 
sense of public obligation or duty on the part of our youth is simply appalling.” 73 
An astronomer stated that “We are  not living ‘in peacetime’” (emphasis in 
original). 74  A college president argued that “There is much to be said for selective 
conscription as far more democratic than the securing of an army from the ranks 
of the unemployed.” 75 
　 In the end, the bill’s opponents never succeeded in changing the tide.  Most 
Americans agreed on the need for some kind of military preparedness.  Not only 
FDR but Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate, also endorsed 
the bill, giving it a bipartisan aura. 76  The framing of the bill as a defensive 
measure―especially the geographical limit to the places draftees would be 
dispatched and the one-year term of service the bill stipulated―gave a nod to 
many isolationist Congressmen who had no opposition to policies that 
strengthened national defense and reassured many other Americans that it would 
only institutionalize a military training program, not a program intended to 
“regiment” American youth. 77  Finally, reasons not strictly military―the 
expectations that the bill would help “toughen” youth or advance social welfare―
boosted the support for the bill.  At the end of August, Gallup asked young men 
the following question: “If the draft law is passed, will you, personally, have any 
objection to spending a year in some branch of military service?” Among men 
between ages twenty-one and twenty-four, who were assumed to be among the 
first to be drafted because fewer were married or had permanent jobs than older 
draft-age men, 68 percent answered that they had no objection.  Among those 
between ages sixteen and twenty, who would mature to draft age if the “war 
emergency” lasted long, 81 percent had no objection.  Some welcomed military 
training because “it would build me up physically and put me on my own for a 
while,” while others simply regarded it as a duty to fulfill, and still others stated 
that “If I have to fight, I want to know how.” Reasons for objection included 
obligations to support their families and career concerns.  These results roughly 
coincided with another poll targeting the general public that the institute 
conducted the same week.  To the question “Do you favor increasing the size of 
our Army and Navy now by drafting men between the ages of 21 and 31 to serve 
 72. Thomas J. Miokie to Edwin C. Johnson, August 28, 1940, Reel 17, CME Records.
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in the armed forces for one year?,” 71 percent responded positively. 78 
 　 Upon signing the bill in September 1940, President Roosevelt claimed that it 
fit squarely within the traditions of American democracy.  By adopting the law in 
peace, he announced, America “has broadened and enriched our basic concepts of 
citizenship.  Besides the clear and equal opportunities, we have set forth the 
underlying other duties, obligations and responsibilities of equal service.” 79  He 
appointed Clarence A. Dykstra as the director of the Selective Service System. 
Dykstra was a political scientist, President of the University of Wisconsin, and a 
member of the AYCM. 80  On October 29, 1940, Secretary of War Stimson, 
blindfolded with a cloth taken from a chair that was used at the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence, drew the first number for the draft lottery.  The 
lottery bowl from World War I was used to reassure the American public that the 
draft was an American tradition, not a drastic departure. 81 
 　 The framing of selective service as a democratic measure, however, did not 
prevent the government from drafting youth disproportionally.  In August 1941, 
Congress relieved men older than twenty-seven from military duty on the ground 
that “mechanized welfare was really a young man’s war.” 82  Although these older 
men were recalled after the U.S. declaration of war on December 8, 1941, the 
military continued to press for young draftees. 83  In November 1942, an 
amendment to the Selective Service Act lowered the draft age to eighteen. 84  With 
the passage of this amendment, the Selective Service System ordered local draft 
boards that men of age forty-five and above should not be drafted.  In the 
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following month, the Army declared that registrants thirty-eight years old and 
above were “unacceptable” for induction. 85  Later in the war, special regulations 
exclusively for youth between ages eighteen and twenty-five were implemented, 
making it more difficult for men in this age group to be deferred. 86 
 　 As a result of these measures, the burden of military service in the U.S. during 
World War II fell heavily on youth in their late teens to mid-twenties.  The 
American public largely accepted as wartime necessity the military’s argument 
that conscription of single men was preferable to drafting men with families, on 
the grounds that young single men were more likely to become strong soldiers, 
easier to adapt to military discipline, much less likely to disturb the economy, and 
would help preserve the family―the alleged pillar of American democracy. 87 
With the end of youth unemployment thanks to the draft and the war industries, 
“the youth problem,” a phrase that had been so prevalent during the Depression, 
quickly came into disuse during the war.  Symbolically, Congress terminated the 
CCC and the NYA in 1942 and 1943, respectively.  Likewise, the AYCM 
disbanded in 1942. 88  By the end of the war, American youth were no longer a 
problem, but the core of the “Greatest Generation” that courageously fought for a 
world safe for democracy. 89 
 Conclusion 
 　 By examining how the debate over the Selective Training and Service Act of 
1940 highlighted the complex interrelations between war-related concerns and 
cultural issues with deeper roots in American society, this article has demonstrated 
that the American experience of World War II cannot be fully understood without 
closely examining the uncertain and transitional years when the Depression was 
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not yet overcome while the war had not officially reached the American shores.  It 
was during these critical yet overlooked years that U.S. conscription policies for 
“total war,” a nascent concept that demanded the mobilization of the entire 
American population, including children and youth, were first debated and 
developed.  The American experience of World War II, typically bookended with 
Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima, was, in fact, a longer and a more gradual process 
whose turning points were not only December 1941 and August 1945. 
 　 This article has also suggested that youth mobilization is an analytical 
framework that connects the Depression and World War II years and allows us to 
examine the U.S. history of World War II in comparative contexts.  The U.S. never 
sought a path toward militarism, but precisely because American democracy 
seemed to be at stake in the 1930s and the 1940s, both state and non-state 
organizations increasingly turned to youth as a generation that provided critical 
manpower to wage wars against the Depression and dictatorship and to secure a 
democratic future.  In order to differentiate the American plans for youth 
mobilization from those implemented by countries considered undemocratic, 
Americans took pains to frame youth mobilization policies in a way that would 
not conflict with the American belief in liberal democracy.  That the principle of 
equal distribution of military service American policy-makers hailed as democratic 
accommodated the disproportional conscription of youth, however, encourages us 
to question the dichotomy of modes of civilian mobilization considered 
democratic and otherwise that has long been taken for granted. 
